Your website is secure. Is your domain? How to stop domain hijacking

In the early hours of 31 October 2026 someone quietly pointed 15 domains at a fake page. The websites themselves were fine. Here's what that incident shows, the settings I'd check in the next 15 minutes, and who should actually hold your domain login.

Rusty sliding bolt and an old padlock on a weathered wooden door

Between 00:35 and 01:18 UTC on 31 October 2026, someone changed where 15 domains pointed, roughly one every two or three minutes. People who typed the correct address landed on a copy built to rob them. The websites were fine. Nobody broke in through a plugin or a weak admin password. The only thing that changed was the record that tells the internet where each name lives.

On 3 November the domain registrar involved published its root cause analysis. The changes came through an account in a support team working for the registrar, using the normal account tools, and it found no exploit of its systems. Several owners or their hosting platforms had their domains pointing home again within one to four hours. The rest waited for the registrar to fix them the next morning; the last one was restored at 16:11 UTC, more than 15 hours after the first change.

I'm not naming the registrar or the sites. It doesn't matter much which company it was. What matters is the gap between the owners who noticed in an hour and the ones who found out from someone else.

What is domain hijacking, in plain words?

Your domain is rented from a registrar, and the registrar keeps a small record that says which servers answer for it. Change that record and every visitor, email and form submission goes wherever the new record says. The address bar still shows your name, because it really is your name.

It happens in two ways. Someone gets into the account that controls the domain and edits the records, or moves the domain to another registrar entirely. Or, as in October, someone on the provider's side makes the change for them. CISA, the US cybersecurity agency, described the first pattern in Emergency Directive 19-01 back in January 2019: steal the login for an account that can edit DNS, swap the address, mail or nameserver records, then get a valid security certificate for the domain, so visitors see no warning at all.

That last step is the nasty one. The padlock in the browser proves the connection is encrypted to whoever controls the name right now. It says nothing about whether that's you.

Why doesn't a secure website help if the domain moves?

Because the attacker never needs to touch it. I spend a fair amount of time on website security checks, updates and backups, and all of it protects the server. A hijack goes around the server. Your site can be fully patched, behind a firewall, with perfect backups, and visitors still never reach it.

Email is the part people forget. The mail records live in the same place as the website records, so whoever changes one can change the other. They can receive password-reset emails meant for you, and if they're patient, that's how a domain problem turns into a problem with every account tied to that address. If you've read how a newsletter account gets turned against its owner, this is the same idea one level down.

The 15-minute checklist

Do this with your registrar account open in one tab and a cup of something in the other hand, because none of it is hard, it just never feels urgent until the morning a customer sends you a screenshot of a page you've never seen. Menu names differ between providers, so I'm describing the settings rather than the buttons. Check all five.

  1. Two-factor authentication on the registrar account. Use an authenticator app or a security key rather than text messages; both the UK NCSC and the US directive above say SMS codes are the weaker option. If anyone else has a login to the account, they need it too.
  2. Transfer lock on. It goes by domain lock, registrar lock or transfer lock. In a public lookup it shows as clientTransferProhibited, which ICANN explains stops the domain being moved to another registrar without your say-so. It doesn't stop changes made from inside your own account, which is why item 1 comes first.
  3. A contact email you still read. Not the address of the person who built your first site in 2017, and not a mailbox on the same domain, because if the domain goes, so does that inbox.
  4. Auto-renew on, with a card that won't expire before the renewal date.
  5. Records you recognise. Look at the DNS records and make sure you can say what each one is for. The nameservers, the website address and the mail records matter most. If there's an entry nobody can explain, ask before deleting it, but do ask.

Then run your domain through ICANN's lookup tool and read the status lines. If you see clientTransferProhibited, the lock is on.

If the registrar listed isn't the one you pay, stop reading this and call them.

On auto-renew, here's why it earns its place. For .com, .net and the other generic domains, ICANN's Expired Registration Recovery Policy makes registrars email you about a month before expiry, about a week before, and once more within five days after. Every one of those goes to the contact email from item 3. Country domains such as .bg or .co.uk follow their own registry's rules, so check with whoever sold you yours.

How do you spot it fast?

The honest answer is that most people find out when a customer says the site looks weird or their email stops arriving. That's what happened in October: the registrar's own timeline shows the first outside report reaching its support desk almost four hours after the first change. The owners and hosting platforms that fixed it within one to four hours had noticed on their own; the first of them started restoring records at 01:53, before anyone had told the registrar a thing.

You don't need a security team to watch. A free uptime monitor that checks your homepage every few minutes, and looks for a word that should always be on it, catches a redirect quickly. I'd also bookmark crt.sh and search your domain once in a while: it lists the public security certificates issued for your name, and the US directive told agencies to watch exactly those logs for certificates they never asked for. A certificate you didn't request, issued last Tuesday, is a strong hint someone controlled your domain for a while.

What should you do if it happens?

Call the registrar first. Use the phone if they have one, and say the words "unauthorised DNS change". Then fix the records yourself if you can still log in, change the account password, and check that two-factor is still yours. Changed records take a while to spread because networks cache the old answer, so some visitors keep seeing the fake page for a bit after you've fixed it. Tell customers plainly what happened and what not to click. If personal data went through the fake page, that's a data breach question with deadlines attached, so loop in whoever handles that for you.

Who should hold the domain login?

Your business should hold it, in an account under an email address the business controls and that more than one person can reach. I feel more strongly about this than anything else on the list. Your developer, me included, should get delegated access, not ownership. I've written about who owns the code and the domain in a website contract, and the domain is the line in that contract I'd read twice.

The other half is boring. Someone has to look at those records and renewal dates a couple of times a year. That's part of what website maintenance actually covers when it's done properly, alongside the web design work people think of first.

One thing I can't tell you yet is how the October change happened. The registrar says it hasn't determined whether the support account was misused on purpose or its credentials were stolen, and it's still reviewing. If it turns out to be stolen credentials, the lesson for every provider is the same one in item 1. If it was deliberate, the only defence an owner had was noticing.

No setting on your side would have stopped a support account at the registrar. A monitor that pinged you at 00:40 is the difference between the owners who were back within a few hours and the ones who waited 15.

Read next